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ABSTRACT 
Cloud Computing is an evolving paradigm that is radically changing the way humans store, share and 
access their digital files. Despite the many benefits, such as the introduction of a rapid elastic resource 
pool, and on-demand service, the paradigm also creates challenges for both users and providers. In 
particular, there are issues related to security and privacy, such as unauthorized access, loss of 
privacy, data replication and regulatory violation that require adequate attention. Nevertheless, and 
despite the recent research interest in developing software engineering techniques to support systems 
based on the cloud, the literature fails to provide a systematic and structured approach that enables 
software engineers to identify security and privacy requirements and select a suitable cloud service 
provider based on such requirements. This paper presents a novel framework that fills this gap. Our 
framework incorporates a modelling language and it provides a structured process that supports 
elicitation of security and privacy requirements and the selection of a cloud provider based on the 
satisfiability of the service provider to the relevant security and privacy requirements. To illustrate our 
work, we present results from a real case study.   
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Software systems are a critical component of human society used in areas such as power, 
telecommunications, health-care, military, and education; not just by major corporations and 
governments but also by individuals who rely on them to perform every day activities. To 
support the above scenario, a new paradigm, known as cloud computing, has grown from a 
promising idea to one of the fastest research and development paradigms of the computing 
industry. Cloud computing supports software systems’ infrastructure where the availability of 
resources, computational or otherwise, used in the specific model is dynamic; meaning that 
the hardware and software is dealt as services offered to the users of the cloud every time 
they need them. By virtually grouping hardware and software and providing it efficiently, 
cloud users are able to achieve great economical savings both in the functional and 
administrative cost of the specific ICT infrastructures.  
However, the storage of personal and sensitive information in the cloud raises 
concerns about the security and privacy of such information and how much the cloud can be 
trusted. Security and privacy in this context requires solutions very different to those 
provided by current research efforts and industrial practices. Solutions that will not only try 
to guarantee security and/or privacy from a technical point of view, but solutions that provide 
clear understanding of the social aspects of security and privacy and take into account, for 
example, organisational structures, privacy needs and appropriate laws and regulations.  
As the concept of cloud computing is relatively new, many organisations and 
individuals are still avoiding cloud services mostly because they are not sure if the services 
provided, by different providers, are suitable for their security and privacy requirements. This 
is especially true since organisations and individuals would have to hand in their personal and 
organizational data into service providers over which they have no control. This introduces an 
extra layer of complexity on top of the expected security and privacy issues that are present in 
any type of software systems and services whether on the cloud or not.  These concerns make 
risky a transition to cloud computing or integration of a cloud solution to an existing IT 
infrastructure.  
It is therefore important, that appropriate software engineering techniques are 
developed to support the structured and systematic identification of security and privacy 
requirements that an organization might have for their systems’ and based on those 
requirements to support selection of appropriate cloud services. However, and despite the 
recent research interest in developing software engineering techniques to support systems 
based on the cloud, the literature fails to provide a systematic and structured approach that 
enables software engineers to identify security and privacy requirements and select a suitable 
service provider based on such requirements.  
Our work fills this gap by providing a process to support elicitation of security and 
privacy requirements and selection of a service provider based on the satisfiability (Giorgini 
et. al., 2002) of the cloud provider to the security and privacy requirements. This paper is 
structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction to the various service and 
deployment models introduced by the cloud computing paradigm and it discusses security 
and privacy issues related to those models. Section 3 introduces our framework, while section 
4 presents the application of the framework to a case study based on a collaborative project in 
the domain of cloud based Electronic Point of Sales (EPOS). Section 5 presents related work 
and Section 6 concludes the paper.     
 
2.0 SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN THE CLOUD  
Before we describe our work, it is important to provide a brief introduction to the various 
cloud computing service and deployment models and discuss the different security and 
privacy issues related to them. Cloud computing is based on three delivery models, Software 
as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), and 
four deployment models, private, community, public, and hybrid cloud.  Security and privacy 
issues are among the most important concerns in cloud computing, as large amounts of 
personal and other sensitive data are managed in the cloud. Several surveys among potential 
cloud adopters indicate that security and privacy is the primary concern hindering its 
adoption (Bruening & Treacy, 2009). Therefore, it is necessary to understand and analyze the 
relevant security and privacy issues before adopting cloud computing into existing 
infrastructure. In doing so, we have performed a systematic literature review (Kitchenham & 
Charters,2007) for understanding security and privacy issues for cloud based systems. As 
stated previously, the need to understand such issues are important and timely from both user 
and provider perspective for successful and trustworthy cloud adaption.  
There is not much work that provides a systematic literature review about security and 
privacy issues in the cloud. The work of Sriram &  Khajeh-Hosseini (2010) aim to  provide a 
comprehensive review of the academic research done in cloud computing. The focus is more 
to define different cloud terminologies such as cloud computing, service model, deployment 
model, and to identify related technologies for designing and building clouds. Rosado et 
al.(2012) provide a review of different approaches related to security for migration process in 
cloud of legacy systems such as model based migration of legacy system into cloud and 
migrating legacy application to service cloud.  
Our literature search process focuses on studies that consider security and privacy 
issues of cloud based systems. In particular, we focus on the security and privacy challenges, 
virtualization, and possible risks, as keywords for the possible inclusion criteria of the cloud 
based system. We identified relevant literature from major research databases such as IEEE 
Xplore, SpringerLink, ScienceDirect, Elesevier, ACM Digital Library, and Google scholar. 
We consider only peer reviewed papers and count the citation of individual papers for 
establishing the impact of a paper. Initially we focused on titles and abstracts and select 35 
papers from a total of 98 relevant papers. Based on the identified studies, we extracted 
several data items that consider threats, vulnerabilities, and risks within the context of cloud 
computing, based on security and privacy. The extracted data was combined based on cloud 
data properties, policies, threats and risks. 
 
2.1 Cloud Service Models  
In IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service), sometimes also called hardware-as-a-service (Grobauer 
et al, 2011), providers generally supply a set of virtual infrastructure components, such as 
virtual servers and storage. Users (customers) can order these components and have them 
running in a matter of minutes. User applications and data run on the provider’s virtual 
machine and are stored in a virtual space. It is the provider’s responsibility to ensure basic 
security, such as virtualization and low-level data protection capabilities. Virtualization 
infrastructure can be used as a launching pad for new attacks (Choo, 2010). Issues such as 
VM image and securing inter-host communication are critical from the provider’s perspective 
(Gellman, 2009). Users have the responsibility to ensure the security of the applications 
managed by them.  The main idea behind SaaS (Software as a Service) is to replace 
applications running on local machines and provide customers with the ability to use 
applications simply through use of web browser from different providers. Software as a 
Service as the core concept behind cloud computing (Erdogmus, 2009). In particular, at the 
end it is software, it does not matter whether the software being delivered is infrastructure, 
platform or application. However customers do not have control over the underlying cloud 
infrastructure, including network, operating system, storage, core functionality of the 
application, and the server itself. Security issues arise from the software that is used to 
manage the relevant customer information. Providers are usually responsible for ensuring the 
security of the customer data. PaaS (Platform as a Service) providers provide a programming 
environment as well as tools that has a visible impact on the application architecture 
deployment with the exception of issues related to the underlying operating system (Gong, 
2010). It is the bridge between hardware and application. Although customers are mostly 
responsible for protecting their own applications, providers also need to ensure that the 
operating system, its modules, and anything below the application layer are secured and 
inaccessible or that there is limited access between applications.  
 
2.2 Cloud Deployment Models  
Before deploying an organization's data and processes to the cloud, it is recommended to 
analyze all different deployment models. This is because not all cloud deployment models are 
appropriate for every service and may not meet specific customer expectations (Bruening & 
Treacy, 2009). It highly depends on the customer's requirements of the system, such as 
control needed over the service and importance of data stored. A private cloud is limited to a 
single customer. Customers generally have control over deployed applications and their own 
infrastructure and can request customizations to fit their needs. Due to this exclusiveness, a 
private cloud is considered safer than the other models. Public clouds require much more 
investment compared to private cloud and usually owned by large organization.  In a public 
cloud, security issues are more critical due to aspects such as virtualization, which arise from 
supporting multiple users. Security measures, such as ensuring access control, data access, 
and availability of individual customer resources is necessary for a secure multi-tenant 
environment. In case of a hybrid cloud, the resources are divided between a private and a 
public cloud. Therefore, security and privacy issues should be paid adequate attention, as 
there may be multiple providers involve that make it difficult for key distribution and mutual 
authentication. 
 
2.3 Cloud Security and Privacy 
 
We consider security and privacy from a holistic perspective based on our extracted data 
from the literature. The term holistic considers both technical issues, such as data integrity , 
availability of service, and accountability of provider activities and non-technical issues such 
as compliance, and policies(Islam et al., 2012b, Islam et al., 2010). Comparing to the other 
software system paradigms, cloud computing has some unique features in terms of service 
and deployment models. Therefore these issues require adequate attention for supporting the 
systematic identification of security and privacy issues in the context of cloud computing. At 
the same time all types of proactive counter measure such as monitoring, patch management, 
and hardening virtual machine instances should be implemented (Rosado et al., 2012). The 
following security and privacy issues are worth considering within the context of cloud 
computing:  
Data integrity. It is one of the most important factors when considering security in the cloud. 
Data integrity can be easily achieved in a standalone system, but because in a cloud solution 
multiple databases are used to store multiple tenants’ data, it is really complex to ensure 
transaction durability and consistency. As the cloud environment is virtualized at some level, 
standard methods, such as HTTP, of maintaining guaranteed transactions are not possible and 
the only way to do that is at Application Programming Interface (API) level (Subastini & 
Kavitha, 2010). Sometimes this introduces extra complexity, and, through complexity, 
possible security vulnerabilities in the API stack itself or the technology handling the API 
calls. Vulnerabilities in API stack could allow an attacker to dump transaction data, intercept 
and provide false or corrupt data to the transaction destination which would lead to further 
data corruption, data theft and service breakdown leading to financial loss.  Data integrity is 
measured by the level of secure channels in place for handling transactions. This is why data 
has to be transferred among servers and databases though secure channels (e.g. SSL), every 
transaction has to be verified for legitimacy (e.g. checksums), certain level atomicity, 
isolation and durable. APIs handling the transactions have to be reliable, well recognized and 
time-tested (e.g. Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)).  
Data segregation. One of the major cloud characteristics is multi-tenancy. In multi-tenancy 
environment several users’ data might be stored at the same physical location using the 
hypervisor techniques under the concept of virtualization. This means that an organization’s 
data may be mingled in various ways with other users’ data causing confidential data 
leakages; while users of other organizations might be exposed with the data of other 
organizations. For example, in 2009 a security flaw was discovered in Google Docs, which 
exposed documents to users that belonged to other users. That security problem happened 
because of crippled user session allocation. The problem was patched within hours, but it 
showed that users’ data storage has to be separated to prevent accidental data leaks.  
Data availability. Providers must provide on-request and reliable service with highest up-
times (it depends on the type and importance of corporate data and processes, but it might be 
up to 99.9999%, which is equivalent to 31.56 seconds of downtime per year (Rosenberg & 
Mateos, 2011)). If an organization’s data gets locked-in and providers fail to provide access, 
this service disruption could pose potential financial damage to the organization and its 
clients.  
Network availability. As cloud usage mostly depends on network connectivity and 
bandwidth, it is vital that the cloud is available whenever needed and that bandwidth 
throughput is able to handle organization storing and retrieving data in the cloud. If these 
conditions are not met, the consequences will be similar to poor data availability. One 
strategy that could be deployed to attain high availability is obtaining the services of multiple 
cloud computing providers, other than a single provider (Armburst et al., 2010). Provider 
could quick the scale-up in case of disruption of network bandwidth. In terms of availability, 
quality of service requirements relating to response time, throughput, reliability, scalability, 
and availability should be negotiated with the service provider(Ferretti et al., 2010).  
Backup strategy. An Organization’s data might be backed-up and encrypted by the provider 
but it might be better, in some cases, for an organization to backup their data on the cloud and 
then encrypt it. Backup and recovery is essential in case of failure. Data backups and 
recovery should be done regularly, and as another security measure backed-up data should be 
encrypted and stored on the different location. Encryption keys should be managed by the 
organization in this case. 
Provider’s transparency. Cloud provider should provide the details of how client data will 
be handled, what types of security they already apply to the cloud infrastructure, what 
happens in case the system was compromised, if and how they will participate in the 
investigation and prosecution. If some details about the internal policies and technology 
implementation are kept in secret, clients must not blindly trust the provider’s claims about 
security in their environment. In this case provider must be investigated well by the 
organization, first assuming that provider’s environment is insecure and after investigation 
making corrections to the initial assumption. Cloud provider might give all the important 
details when contacted directly, but it is better to be safe first and hold from quick decisions.  
Data Protection. Customer data protection is a core concern of security and privacy 
measures in cloud computing. Privacy is a moral and legal right of individuals. Data owner 
need to be ensured that their data is not shared with any third party (Takabi et al., 2010). 
Storing data and applications that reside outside the organization’s premises poses the 
potential risk of unauthorized access and processing of the data and application (Chen, 2010). 
Customers may lose control over their critical assets. Data confidentiality and privacy risks 
may be more critical when providers reserve the right to change their terms and conditions. 
Apart from the data theft from external attackers, data leakage can also be carried out by the 
employees of the service providers. Therefore, measures such as privacy policy, data subject 
consent and control, unlinkability, transparency of data, data operations, and assurance of 
data protection are necessary and should be included in the SLA.  
Organizational Policies.  The cloud provider needs to establish trust in the service offered to 
the customers (Chen,2010). To achieve a certain level of trust, organizations need to  
develop, document, and deploy policies relating to information security management 
systems, legal compliance, and service level agreement. Policy refers to a set of rules to be 
followed by the participating entities within the cloud environment (Islam & Dong, 2008). 
Organizations should have a clearly defined access control, privacy, back up, disaster 
recover, business continuity and key management policy (Islam et al., 2012b). Access control 
determines how customers and providers can be identified, authenticated and authorized to 
access data and service.  Privacy policy is a comprehensive description of the way the 
information is handled, stored and used. It should truly protect customer privacy and the 
customer should have maximum control over the data and processing. Key management 
policy deals with the management of keys for the cryptographic operation. This policy 
provides guideline how to generate exchange, store, distribute, and replace keys. Disaster 
recovery and business continuity focus how in particular cloud service provider recovers 
from any failure and continue their business to support the customer.  This policy should also 
suggest approaches to satisfying information security and data privacy laws and directives 
with a view to minimizing the impact of management overhead on organizational resources 
and efficiency. Policies should be unambiguous, understandable and agreed upon by all 
participating entities.  Cloud users should understand all the above mentioned provider’s 
policies before undertaking cloud to support existing business infrastructure. 
Legal Compliance. Legal compliance is a significant challenge for cloud-based systems. 
Although a large number of information security and data privacy laws exist, depending on 
the country and location, there is no single, comprehensive legal framework in which the 
legal rights, liabilities, and obligations of cloud providers and cloud users are formulated 
(Islam et al, 2011). Both providers and customers need to comply with existing regulatory 
requirements and Service Level Agreements (SLAs). SLA should be complete as well as well 
structured, taking into consideration the right to audit such as quality of service attributes 
should monitor continuously and enforced by SLA (Dawoud, 2010). On the one hand, 
customers may have to give their private data and important processes into the hands of 
personnel and out of their control. On the other hand, providers may be obliged to search the 
data due to national security or to comply with local jurisdiction. The law is enforced at the 
place the data is stored as well as the place from where data is transmitted. Customers should 
take note of the jurisdictions in which their data may be stored or processed in. Therefore, it 
is necessary to identify and analyze issues such as legal rights and alignment of SLA with 
legal obligations, protection and enforcement requirements before deploying a cloud 
computing solution. 
 
2.4 Security and privacy threats 
Security and privacy threats are one of the main primary concerns in cloud computing and 
present strong barrier for cloud adaption. Threats relating to insecure API, session or service 
hijacking, authentication and identity management, privacy protection,  malicious insiders, 
and service management should be identified and controlled through a systematic risk 
management method(CloudThreat,2010; Takabi et al., 2010). Vulnerabilities can arise from 
unique cloud properties such as Ubiquitous network access and On-demand self-service, 
cloud infrastructure and technology such as virtualization, software environment, and 
computational resource (Grobauer et al. (2011)). When security of cloud infrastructure gets 
compromised, the provider should react quickly and prevent further unauthorized access; 
patch security holes as soon as possible and almost immediately inform clients. Letting 
clients know about the breach will allow them to take appropriate actions to protect their data 
even if their system and data were not affected. Privacy risks such as data leakage, and policy 
breach can be controlled if the appropriate policies and agreement are used for ensuring 
accountability of the every activity.  Providers must initiate or offer help in the breach 
investigation and prosecution. Like security, privacy is an important issue in cloud computing 
in terms of both legal compliance and trust. Customers pay more attention to the privacy 
issues in cloud because customer data stored in the cloud often contains sensitive information 
(Islam et al., 2012 b).  Customers have less control over this data and the overall cloud 
infrastructure may not be trustworthy.  
Loss of physical control. Organizations are worried about losing physical control over their 
data and business processes. The idea of the cloud computing is to outsource them increasing 
business performance and decreasing costs. But this means that data and processes are no 
longer in the total control of the organization, someone else will be dealing with them and 
both data and processes might reside on different physical locations. Provider on their side 
must ensure organization has maximum control possible over the data and business 
processes. 
Vulnerabilities in virtualization. Virtualization is one of the base components in the cloud 
infrastructure. It allows the cloud infrastructure to be shared among multiple users but 
logically separated area through hypervisor technology.  If security laid in virtualization 
technology is vulnerable it could cause major security breaches from both organization’s and 
provider’s perspective. Attacker or a malicious user might exploit vulnerability in 
virtualization layer and get access to other instances or virtual machines running on the same 
physical machine or to underlying system running virtualized environment itself. For 
instance, an attacker can exploit side-channel attack to instantiate new VMs of a target VM, so 
that new VM can monitor the cache of the physical machine.  A path traversal vulnerability was 
discovered in one of the leading virtualization vendor’s – Vmware – solution: it allowed 
attacker to break out of isolated guest system and compromise underlying host system. Such 
vulnerability has high impact on the cloud environment. If host system, running several 
applications and guest virtual systems is compromised, multiple tenants, users might be 
affected: data stolen, new virtual machines launched to raise attack to the higher level (e.g. 
for the Denial-of-service attack (DDoS)). To prevent this happening virtualization system 
should run on lowest permissions possible and be extra hardened and patched frequently. 
Furthermore, user privilege to access the system should be need basis and privileged users 
access needs cloud monitoring and control. 
 
3.0 FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Overview of the framework  
The proposed framework consists of a language and a process that is focused on the 
requirements engineering stage. The language employs concepts from the requirements, 
security and privacy engineering domains, and it is based on our previous work on security 
requirements engineering, and in particular Secure Tropos (Mouratidis, 2004) (Mouratidis et. 
al, 2007) and privacy requirements engineering, and in particular PRiSE (Kalloniatis, 2008). 
However, the language is enriched with new concepts, such as cloud actor, measure, and 
mechanisms, which are necessary to support the selection of the cloud provider. The process 
follows the typical cycle of a requirements engineering process where we have the 
requirements elicitation and the requirements analysis phases. Elicitation is focused on 
ensuring that a system’s requirements are elicited and understood, while analysis focuses on 
ensuring that requirements are specified and modelled. To support the proposed framework, a 
tool has been developed using the Open Models Initiative (OMI) Platform 
(www.openmodels.at). The proposed framework demonstrates an important set of unique 
characteristics: 
 
• Its metamodel unifies requirements, security and privacy concepts; 
• The process introduces a structure approach to the elicitation and analysis of security 
and privacy requirements; 
• It supports the selection of a cloud service provider based on the security and privacy 
mechanisms required by the system; 
• It uses the same concepts throughout the process to support common understanding. 
This is particularly important since using different techniques and methods usually 
results in misunderstandings due to the differences on concepts and terminology used 
by the different approaches; 
• It enables the analysis of security, privacy and system requirements under one 
uniform framework, which results in the identification of conflicts that usually exist 
between these types of requirements and enables the resolution of such conflicts and 
the identification of security and privacy mechanisms that satisfy the relevant 
requirements.  
 
 
3.2 Language 
 
The language of the proposed framework is based on concepts that have been defined in 
the requirements engineering discipline, and in particular in the i* framework (Yu, 1995), 
combined with concepts from the security requirements engineering literature, and in 
particular Secure Tropos (Mouratidis, 2004), and enhanced with concepts from security 
engineering and privacy engineering, and in particular PRiS (Kalloniatis, 2008). In particular, 
our metamodel, illustrated in Figure 1, defines the concept of an Actor as an entity that has 
strategic goals and intentions within the system or within an organisational setting (Yu, 
1995). An actor can be human, a system, or an organisation. We also define a special class of 
an actor, a cloud actor. A cloud actor is an actor that demonstrates two unique characteristics, 
it provides a deployment model and it supports a service model. It is worth stating that as an 
actor, a cloud actor also inherits all the attributes and associations of the actor, for example it 
has goals, capabilities and it requires resources. We also differentiate a special class of an 
actor, a malicious actor. A malicious actor’s intention is to introduce threats to the system, 
which exploit vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are defined as weaknesses or flaws, in terms of 
security and privacy that exists from a resource, an actor and/or a goal. Vulnerabilities are 
exploited by threats, as an attack or incident within a specific context. It is worth stating that 
legitimate actors might unintentionally introduce vulnerabilities to a system due to failure or 
mistakes. Threats pose potential loss or indicate problems that can put the system at risk. On 
the other hand, actors within the system environment have single or multiple goals A Goal 
represents an actors’ strategic interests (Yu, 1995). Higher level strategic goals may be 
decomposed in simpler operational goals forming AND/OR goals hierarchy. Our meta-model 
differentiates between organizational, security and privacy goals, These goals introduce 
security and privacy constraints. A Constraint is used to represent a set of restrictions that do 
not permit specific actions to be taken, restrict the way that actions can be taken or prevent 
certain system objectives from being achieved (Mouratidis, 2004). Security and privacy 
constraints are clearly defined as separate concepts to support a clear and well-structured 
elicitation and analysis of security and privacy requirements. When a constraint is introduced, 
further analysis is required to establish if and how that constraint can be satisfied. Within the 
context of our metamodel, a constraint is satisfied by a measure. A measure represents a 
generic, implementation independent form of control that indicates how a constraint will be 
achieved. Measures are operationalised by relevant plans. A plan defines a specific way of 
operationalising a measure, i.e. the details and conditions under which a specific measure is 
operationalised. Plans are implemented by relevant mechanisms. A mechanism is defined as a 
technical solution that realizes one or more plans. Mechanisms are software products 
developed already or customized software tools for realizing plans for the specific 
organization. Mechanisms require resources and they are supported by capabilities. An actor 
has capabilities, which enable her to support the implementation of mechanisms. It is worth 
mentioning that the types of measures, plans, mechanisms follow the type of the constraint 
that the measure satisfies. For example, a security constraint is satisfied by a security 
measure, which is operationalized by a security plan, which is implemented by a security 
mechanism.  
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Fig 1. Meta model for security and privacy concepts 
 
3.3 Stakeholders 
  
We have identified a number of stakeholders who take part in the development process of the 
presented framework. These are briefly described below: 
 
• System Owner: This represents an entity, such as an organisation or individual, who 
owns the system under development.  
• Requirements Engineer: The Requirements Engineer is responsible for eliciting and 
analysing the requirements of the system. She/He might be part of the organisation 
that owns the system, or she/he might be an external consultant.  
• Security Engineer: The Security Engineer is responsible for supporting the elicitation, 
analysis and implementation of security requirements. She/he might be part of the 
organisation that owns the system, or she/he might be an external consultant.  
• Privacy Engineer: The Privacy Engineer is responsible for supporting the elicitation, 
analysis and implementation of security requirements. She/he might be part of the 
organisation that owns the system, or she/he might be an external consultant.  
• Cloud Expert: The Cloud Expert is responsible for providing cloud computing related 
expertise to the project and for supporting the cloud provider selection by analysing 
the cloud providers, and weight their contribution.  
 
It is worth stating that most of the times, the roles of Privacy and Security Engineer will be 
played by the same expert.  
 
3.4 Process 
 
The process supported by the framework is iterative and it is based on the development of a 
set of models that are incrementally refined to include further details. It provides a structured 
way of eliciting and analysing security and privacy requirements, identifying relevant 
security and privacy mechanisms and of selecting an appropriate cloud service provider based 
on these mechanisms. It comprises of three main activities: the Security and Privacy 
Cataloguing, the Security and Privacy Analysis, and the Selection of Cloud Service Provider. 
Each one of these activities has specific inputs and it results in specific outputs. It is worth 
mentioning that only two of these activities, i.e. the Security and Privacy Requirements 
Analysis, and the Selection of Cloud Service Provider are compulsory. The Security and 
Privacy Cataloguing is an optional activity, which can assist in identifying relevant security 
and privacy issues during the Security and Privacy Requirements Analysis. This means that 
depending on the structure of an organisation, its resources and the team allocated to carry 
out the process, some organisations will make use of the Security and Privacy Cataloguing to 
develop a catalogue of security and privacy issues to support their security and privacy 
requirements elicitation and analysis and the identification of relevant security and privacy 
mechanisms, while others will not use the cataloguing activity.    
To support easier understanding and to better enhance communication of the 
presented process, we make use of the OMG standard Software & Systems Process 
Engineering Metamodel (SPEM) version 2.0 (OMG, 2008). SPEM is a process meta-model, 
which is used to describe a concrete software development process or a family of related 
software development processes. The SPEM specification is structured as a UML profile, and 
provides a complete MOF-based meta-model. This meta-process modelling is a type of 
metamodelling used in software engineering to support the effort of creating flexible process 
models. In accordance with SPEM, we specify the process with its activities and 
inputs/outputs as shown in Figure 2 and furthermore we describe (in the corresponding 
section) each activity by specifying: the WorkProduct as both input and output respectively; 
the roles that perform or participate in this RoleUse activity; the collection of Steps defined 
for a TaskUse that represents all the work that should be carried out to achieve the overall 
development goal of the Activity; and the Guidance that specifies the practices, techniques or 
standards to consider when performing the TaskUse. 
 
 Fig. 2: Process definition in SPEM 
 
3.4.1 Security and Privacy Cataloguing  
The security and privacy cataloguing activity assists in identifying and cataloguing security 
and privacy issues. Such information can be employed in later activities of the process to 
support the elicitation and analysis of security and privacy requirements and the identification 
of relevant security and privacy measures and mechanisms. In fact the main aim of this 
activity is to develop a reference catalogue model that can be employed not just for the 
project for which it was initially developed but to work as a reference model for any projects 
that demonstrate similar characteristics. Therefore the security and privacy cataloguing 
activity aims to help the development of a reference point that is based on previous 
experience and support the modification and/or extension of that reference based on an 
individual software system needs. It is expected that the Security and Privacy Catalogue will 
be developed by security and privacy experts with input for relevant domain experts. For 
instance, a security and privacy catalogue for cloud computing requires significant input of 
cloud computing experts. In some cases, the knowledge represented needs to be focused on 
specific organisational processes and procedures, and in that case an organisational expert is 
needed. As mentioned above, this activity is optional and whether it is needed or not depends 
on a number of factors: 
• Previous Knowledge: There are organisations that might already have developed 
catalogues not just for security and privacy but for any factor related to potential 
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systems development in which they are involved. Such catalogues might be 
represented in various forms, such as software repositories, patterns, Open Archival 
Information System (OAIS) models, or just simple textual catalogues.   
• Development Team Organisation: In projects where the main development effort 
during the requirements engineering process depends involves only requirements 
engineers, who might not have relevant security and privacy expertise, then a 
catalogue would be useful for the requirements engineers to be able to understand and 
analyse security and privacy issues. On the other hand, in projects where security and 
privacy experts are involved during the requirements analysis and elicitation process, 
a catalogue might not be necessary.  
• Constraints: Depending on the constraints, in terms of time, cost, resources, that 
might be imposed to a project, the development of a reference catalogue for security 
and privacy might not be feasible.  
 
When a catalogue is employed, it can be useful for the later activities of our process since it 
can support the elicitation of security and privacy requirements, identification of relevant 
measures and definition of relevant security and privacy mechanisms. For example, a 
requirements engineer might not be familiar what privacy mechanisms are needed for 
implementing a specific privacy plan. The catalogue can be used in that case to guide the 
engineer.  
As stated above, our framework does not restrict the form that the artefact from the 
security and privacy cataloguing activity takes. This is important in order to allow usage of 
existing catalogues. However, as part of our framework we have developed a diagram that 
can be employed to model the results of the security and privacy cataloguing. Usage of that 
diagram introduces an important advantage for the system developers, since the proposed 
security and privacy cataloguing diagram uses the same concepts as the rest of our process. 
As such, a direct transfer of information between the security and privacy reference catalogue 
and the rest of the diagrams of the proposed process is possible. Moreover, support is 
provided by the framework’s tool to develop the cataloguing diagram. Table 1 illustrates the 
definition of the Security and Reference Cataloguing in SPEM. 
 
Table 1: Security and Privacy Reference Analysis Activity define in SPEM.    
Security and Privacy Reference Cataloguing 
Activity {kind: phase}: Security and Privacy Reference Cataloguing 
ProcessPerformer {Kind: optional} 
RoleUse: Security Expert{Kind: in} 
RoleUse: Privacy Expert {Kind: in} 
RoleUse: Domain Expert {Kind: in} 
WorkDefinitionParameter {Kind: in} 
WorkProductUse: Oganization Security Knowledge 
WorkProductUse: Oganization Privacy Knowledge 
WorkProductUse: Security/Privacy Features Catalogues 
WorkProductUse: Security/ Privacy Threats Catalogues 
Work DefinitionParameter {Kind: out} 
WorkProductUse: Security and Privacy Reference Catalogue Diagram 
Steps 
Step: Identify Security and Privacy Goals  
Step: Identify threats  
Step: Identify security and privacy measures  
Step: Identify security and privacy mechanisms  
 
3.4.2 Security and Privacy Analysis 
The next main activity in our process is the security and privacy analysis activity, which aims 
to assist developers during the software system development cycle to identify relevant 
security and privacy requirements of the system along with relevant measures and protection 
mechanisms. That information is then used on the last activity of the proposed framework to 
support the selection of a suitable cloud provider. The activity consists of two main sub-
activities, each with a number of steps. A definition of the overall activity, using SPEM, is 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Security and Privacy Requirements Elicitation SPEM definition  
Security and Privacy Requirements Analysis 
Activity {kind: phase}: Security and Privacy Requirements Analysis 
ProcessPerformer {Kind: primary} 
RoleUse: Requirements Engineer {Kind: in} 
RoleUse: Security Expert {Kind: in} 
RoleUse: Privacy Expert {Kind: in} 
RoleUse: Cloud Expert {Kind: in} 
WorkDefinitionParameter {Kind: in} 
WorkProductUse: Oganization Policies 
WorkProductUse: Security and Privacy Reference Catalogue {kind: optional} 
WorkProductUse: Oganization Requirements 
Work DefinitionParameter {Kind: out} 
WorkProductUse: Security and Privacy Organisational Diagram 
WorkProductUse: Security and Privacy System Diagram 
Steps 
Step: Define Organisational Context 
Step: Define Security and Privacy Concerns 
 
 
3.4.2.1 Define Organisational Context 
This is the first sub-activity, which triggers the whole process for security and privacy 
requirements engineering. It allows understanding of the organisational context and in 
particular identification of organisational goals, actors, their plans, resources and a set of 
security and privacy goals. The output of this activity provides an overview of the 
organisation, which is necessary to identify, and analyse the relevant security and privacy 
needs. The main output of this activity is a set of organisational goals, actors, goals, plans, 
resources, security and privacy goals. As shown in Figure 3, it consists of four main steps: 
Identification of Organisational Goals, Identification of Actors and Dependencies, 
Identification of Plans and Resources, Identification of Security and Privacy Goals. 
 
 
 
 Fig. 3: Define Organisational Context steps 
Identification of organisational goals  
In our work, we consider an organisation has a set of actors who have some common 
goals. These are the organisational goals that support the overall objective and business needs 
of the organisation.  These goals can be initially high level goals that can be refined to 
provide more explicit goals. Such explicit lower level sub-goals contribute to meet the parent 
goal. Goal refinement is achieved using relevant goal-oriented requirements engineering 
techniques, such as AND/OR hierarchies. In identifying organisational goals, the 
organisational business plan plays an important role, as the various main stakeholders related 
to the organisation.  
 
Identification of actors and dependencies 
This step considers identification of the entities related to the organisation in terms of 
actors. Actors can be identified both from within the organisation and from outside the 
organisation and they can be, as indicated earlier in the paper, humans as well as systems.  It 
is worth mentioning that it is important to identify, not just actors that directly contribute to 
the goals of the organisation, but also actors that indirectly make some kind of contribution. 
For instance, in cases where an organisational actor depends on a non-organisational actor for 
the achievement of a goal, or plan or the provision of a resource, the latter should be included 
in the set of relevant actors. As part of that step, relevant dependencies between the various 
actors are also identified.  
 
Identification of Plans and Resources 
Generally an actor within an organisation has goals, executes plans to fulfil those 
goals, and uses (informational or physical) resources to achieve plans. Such plans and 
resources required from the identified actors to fulfil their goals (both individual goals as well 
as organisational) need to be identified. The main concern when dealing with resources is 
whether the resource is available and who is responsible for its delivery. It is also important, 
during this step, to make sure that plans and resources that an actor needs to satisfy any 
dependencies are also being identified.  
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Identification of Security and Privacy Goals 
The relevant security and privacy goals need to be elicited. In doing so, the Security and 
Privacy catalogue can be employed, if it exists, but it is important to make use of relevant laws and 
regulations as well as any previous experience that the development team might have. If the 
organisation has a security policy, this would be an important source of information. It is worth 
stating that the main aim of this step is not to “blind” use all the Security and Privacy Goals that exist 
in the literature, but to identify those that are relevant to the system. For example, there might be that 
all security goals might be relevant, i.e. Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, while only 
unlicability is the relevant privacy goal.  
3.4.2.2 Define Security and Privacy concerns 
Once the organisational context is defined, the next sub-activity focuses on the identification of 
security and privacy requirements. As stated previously, we introduce the term security and privacy 
constraints to enable developers to adequately capture security and privacy requirements. As 
illustrated in Figure 4, this sub-activity consists of the following three steps: Identify Security and 
Privacy Requirements, Identify Security and Privacy Measures, Identify Security and Privacy 
Mechanisms.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Define Security and Privacy Concerns steps 
 
Identify security and privacy requirements  
This step identifies the relevant security and privacy constraints. In the context of our 
work we define a constraint as a restriction, related to the security and privacy issues, 
imposed to one or more actors, which restricts the actor from performing certain actions 
(Mouratidis, 2004). Constraints aim to support the security and privacy goals and they are 
elicited from various sources such as organisational goals, stakeholder needs, respective laws 
and directives, security policies, possible threats identified from risk analysis methods etc. 
Generally actors perform specific plans by respecting the constraints imposed to them and 
they require certain resources to accomplish the relevant plans in order to fulfil their goals. 
Actors might depend on other actors for plans they cannot accomplish themselves. As part of 
that activity, relevant threats and vulnerabilities are also identified and security constraints 
are introduced to the system to enable protection from such threats and vulnerabilities. The 
security and privacy reference catalogue can play an important aspect on the identification of 
threats and vulnerabilities, since developers are able to input directly identified threats to this 
activity.    
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 Identify Security and Privacy Measures 
This step aims to identify security and privacy measures that support the satisfaction 
of relevant security and privacy constraints. Measures are identified with the support of 
security and privacy experts as well as cloud experts. Moreover, plans are identified for each 
actor to support the operationalization of the identified measures.   
 
Identify Security and Privacy Mechanisms 
This step aims to identify security and privacy mechanisms that support the 
implementation of the relevant plans. Similarly to measures, mechanisms can be identified 
with the support of security and privacy experts as well as cloud experts and usage can be 
made of the security and privacy catalogue, if such catalogue exists.  
 
 
3.4.3 Selection of Cloud Service Provider 
Once all the security and privacy mechanisms have been identified, the next activity includes 
the selection of an appropriate service provider based on the degree of satisfaction of these 
mechanisms by potential cloud providers. For this reason, we have developed an analysis 
technique to enable developers to select among alternative cloud providers using as criteria 
the security and privacy mechanisms of the software system under development.  
The proposed technique is similar to the evaluation process for organisational styles 
proposed by Kolp et al. (2001). The main difference is that Kolp’s process is based on a 
qualitative reasoning, while the technique proposed by this research is based on an 
independent probabilistic model, which uses the measure of satisfiability proposed by 
Giorgini et al. (2002). In our work, satisfiability represents the probability that the security 
and/or privacy mechanism will be satisfied. Thus, the evaluation results in contribution 
relationships from the cloud provider to the probability of satisfying the security and/or 
privacy mechanisms of the system identified in the previous activity of our process.  
To express the contribution of each provider to the satisfiability of each 
security/privacy requirement of the system, a weight is assigned. Weights take a value 
between 0 and 1. The allocation of such weights is performed by the security, privacy and 
cloud experts after studying the required security and privacy mechanisms and the various 
characteristics and provisions that a potential cloud provider has in place to support these 
mechanisms. To assist the allocation of the weights, we have developed a four points scale, 
which needs to be used by the experts for each provider and their provision for each of the 
mechanisms. That scale is as follows: 
• When the provider has no provision to support the required security and/or privacy 
mechanism, then a weight of 0.25 is allocated.  
• When the provider has limited provision to support the required security and/or 
privacy mechanism, then a weight of 0.5 is allocated. 
• When the provider has provision to support the required security and/or privacy 
mechanism, but such provision has not been tested, then a weight of 0.75 is allocated.  
• When the provider has a fully tested provision to support the security and/or privacy 
mechanism, then a weight of 1 is allocated.  
 
In order to understand the level of provisions provided by each provider, experts 
might perform different techniques such as questionnaires, interviews etc. Our framework 
assumes that any final decision made on the estimate of the satisfiability is based on expert 
judgments or through the use of a procedure for reaching consensus in the event of 
disagreements amongst the experts.  
Once a consensus has been reached and the various satisfiability weights have been 
recorded, the overall satisfiability level is calculated for each provider. The overall 
satisfiability level is calculated by summing up all the satisfiability values of an individual 
cloud provider and dividing that sum by the number of security and privacy mechanisms 
required by the system. The cloud provider with the highest satisfaction level is the preferred 
provider. If one or more providers achieve the same satisfaction level, then relevant security 
and privacy mechanisms are prioritized and a prioritization weight is allocated to the 
satisfiability levels. The provider with the highest satisfability level is the preferred provider. 
Table 3 illustrates the SPEM definition for this activity. 
 
 Table 3: SPEM definition for Selection of Cloud Provider Selection 
Selection of Cloud Service Provider 
Activity {kind: phase}: Selection of Cloud Service Provider  
ProcessPerformer {Kind: primary} 
RoleUse: Requiremetns Engineer {Kind: in} 
RoleUse: Cloud Expert {Kind: in} 
WorkDefinitionParameter {Kind: in} 
WorkProductUse: Security and Privacy Requirements Analysis  
Work DefinitionParameter {Kind: out} 
WorkProductUse: Cloud Provider Selection Diagram {Kind:out} 
WorkProductUse: Preferred Service 
Steps 
Step: List Security and Privacy Mechanisms 
Step: Identify Relevant Cloud Service Providers 
 Step: Analyse Service Providers based on satisfiability weights 
 
 
3.5 Tool Support and Diagrams 
The framework is supported by a tool that has been developed based on the Open Models 
Initiative ADOxx Platform (www.openmodels.at). ADOxx is a platform, similar to Eclipse, 
developed specifically to support the creation of tools for modelling methods based on the 
methods metamodel.  The tool provides an environment for developers to create a number of 
diagrams that support the described process. In particular, the process described in the 
previous section results in the development of four artefacts represented in terms of four 
diagrams. These are the Security and Privacy Reference Catalogue Diagram, the Security 
and Privacy Organisational Diagram, the Security and Privacy System Requirements 
Diagram and the Cloud Provider Selection Diagram respectively.  
 
3.5.1 Security and Privacy Reference Catalogue Diagram 
For the construction process of the security and privacy reference catalogue  diagram the 
team of developers, requirements engineer, security, privacy and cloud experts, consider 
security and privacy goals, security and privacy measures, and security and privacy 
mechanisms, along with security and privacy threats. A graphical representation of the above-
mentioned concepts of the security reference diagram is depicted in Figure 5. 
  
 Fig.5: Graphical representation of nodes used in the security and privacy reference diagram 
 
Please note that although the graphical representation of Security and Privacy goals, 
the two can be differentiated by the prefix [S] or [P] before the goal description. The same is 
true for the graphical representation of Security and Privacy measures and Security and 
Privacy mechanisms. The above-mentioned nodes of the diagram are associated with the aid 
of two types of links: positive and negative contribution links. A positive contribution link 
associates two nodes when one node helps in the fulfilment of the other. Consider, for 
instance, a security measure that contributes positively to the satisfaction of a security 
objective. A negative contribution link, on the other hand, indicates that a node contributes 
towards the denial of another node. As an example, consider the contribution of a privacy 
threat to a privacy objective. As a result, in every security and privacy reference catalogue 
diagram, each security/privacy objective identified receives positive contributions from 
different measures and negative contributions from different threats. Graphically a positive 
contribution link is modelled as an arrow, which points towards the node that is satisfied, 
with a plus (+) whereas a negative contribution link is represented as an arrow with a minus 
(-). 
 
3.5.2 Security and Privacy Organisational Diagram Model 
This diagram is the output of the Define Organisational Context activity. The diagram is 
constructed using a defined set of concepts (actor, dependency, goal, constraint, plan, and 
resource), presented in the metamodel illustrated in the previous section. The construction of 
the diagram follows an iterative refinement-based process, where a higher level diagram is 
first developed that is constantly refined to better illustrate the organisational actors along 
with their goals, plans and resource and the relevant constraints. Although there are no 
specific rules on how the diagram can be constructed, i.e. which concepts need to be 
introduced first, second and so on in the diagram, a useful guidance is the following: 
• Identify all actors with their high level goals; 
• Identify those high level goals that the actors cannot achieve on their own and they 
depend on other actors; 
• Define the dependencies for those goals; 
• For each actor on the diagram, refine their goals in terms of sub-goals, plans and 
resources; 
• Identify new dependencies if required (new sub-goals, plans, resources which the 
actor cannot achieve on their own) and model those new dependencies; 
• Identify security and privacy goals and modelled those goals. 
 The above steps, follow an iterative process until a satisfactory diagram has been constructed. 
Figure 6 illustrates the notation employed by the diagram.  
 
 
 
Fig. 6: Security and Privacy Organisational Diagram notation 
 
3.5.3 Security and Privacy System Diagram 
This diagram is the output of the Define Security and Privacy Concerns activity. It 
makes use of a defined set of concepts (actor, dependency, goal, constraint, measure, plan, 
protection mechanism, resource, threat, vulnerability), presented in the metamodel illustrated 
in the previous section. Similarly to the Security and Privacy Organisational Diagram an 
iterative process is followed. The Security and Privacy System Diagram receives as input the 
analysis of the Security and Privacy Organisational Diagram and in particular the information 
related to the system actor of the previous diagram. As such the system actor, together with 
its goals, plans, resources and security and privacy goals represents the starting point for the 
security and privacy system diagram. Although it depends on the developers how the diagram 
will be constructed, we have found the following steps useful: 
• Identify threats and vulnerabilities relate to the goals, plans and resources of the 
system actor based on the identified security and privacy goals.  
• Introduce one or more security and privacy constraints for every threat and 
vulnerability in order to support the system’s relevant security and privacy goals; 
• Identify one or more security and privacy measures for every security and privacy 
constraints of the system actor; 
• Identify one or more security and privacy plans for every security and privacy 
measures of the system actor; 
• Analyse whether the system actor can operationalize all the identified security and 
privacy plans or if dependencies are required. In case dependencies are required, 
model those dependencies.  
• Introduce mechanisms to support the security and privacy plans identified in the 
previous step.  
• Analyse whether the system actor can implement all the identified mechanisms, or if 
dependencies are required. In case dependencies are required model those 
dependencies.  
Figure 7 illustrates the notation of the concepts used in the diagram. 
 
 
 Fig. 7: Security and Privacy System Diagram notation 
 
3.5.4 Cloud Provider Selection Diagram 
The selection of cloud service provider activity results in a cloud provider selection diagram. 
The diagram makes use of a defined set of concepts (cloud actor, deployment model, service 
model, security and privacy mechanisms) from the metamodel illustrated in the previous 
section. The diagram also makes use of satisfiability links to represent the satisfaction of the 
cloud actor to the relevant security and privacy mechanisms. It includes the following 
components: Security and Privacy mechanisms, service providers, satisfiability links, and 
satisfiability weights. A graphical representation of those concepts is shown in Figure 8.  
 
 
Fig. 8: Graphical representation of the service selection diagram nodes 
 
The construction of the diagram follows the following rules: 
• First the security and privacy mechanisms are modelled on the top of the diagram. In 
case that a prioritisation of such mechanisms has taken place, the most “important” 
mechanisms are modelled on the left hand side of the diagram and the least 
“important” on the right hand side; 
• Once the mechanisms have been modelled, cloud actors, representing cloud service 
providers, are modelled on the bottom of the diagram. Although there is no specific 
provision on how service providers should be depicted in terms of a sequence on the 
diagram, an alphabetical sequence is usually advised; 
• For each cloud actor, relevant deployment and service models are identified; 
• For each cloud actor, satisfiability links, together with the relevant satisfiability 
weights, are introduced for every mechanism modelled on the diagram.  
 
4.0 CASE STUDY 
To demonstrate the applicability of the proposed framework, we employ the proposed 
approach in a real-world case study based on the development of a cloud-based solution for 
the domain of Electronic-Point-Of-Sale (EPOS). The case study reported is part of a 
Knowledge Exchange project that took place between April and August 2012 between the 
School of Architecture, Computing and Engineering at the University of East London and a 
company specialising at the provision of EPOS solutions1. EPOS Ltd is a U.K. based 
company that provides both software (e.g. cash registers software, sales and stock analysis) 
and hardware (e.g. PC based cash registers, scanners, printers) solutions for EPOS. The aim 
of the project was to develop a cloud based solution that will enable the company to distribute 
its EPOS software over the cloud and also manage remotely issues such as licensing and 
maintenance. SPA Ltd anticipates that a cloud-based solution will reduce their costs 
(especially maintenance costs), will attract more customers due to the flexibility that can be 
applied on licensing agreements, and improve their green credential. They also hope that they 
will be able to expand to different markets and utilise different (mobile) platforms to provide 
                                                          
1
 For confidentiality reasons we are not allowed to disclose the name of the company so we use the name 
“EPOS Ltd” to refer to it throughout the paper.  
their customers an all-around solution. However, they recognise that security and privacy 
issues are very important in such scenario and they want to make sure that they have a good 
understanding of their security and privacy requirements and that they select a provider for 
their envisaged system that fulfils those requirements.   
EPOS Ltd provides EPOS solutions to different types of clients, ranging from 
supermarkets to pubs to night clubs. Although the business objectives and aims of EPOS Ltd 
remain the same, irrespective of the type of client, the solutions provided are slightly different 
due to the unique characteristics that each type of client demonstrates. For the purposes of 
this paper, we focus on the application of our work to a scenario that involves a Night Club as 
a client2. Good Time Ltd operates a number of venues across the U.K., ranging from 
relatively small, in terms of EPOS, venues with 4 tills to rather large ones, with 30 tills. 
However, these tills are not all used on a daily basis. Most of these venues use all their tills 
during Fridays and Saturdays, while only use some of the tills during the rest of the week and 
they are closed on Sundays. EPOS Ltd aimed to develop a cloud based system that would 
enable Good Time Ltd venues to use EPOS software and pay licensing according to their true 
usage. In other words, EPOS Ltd aims to provide Software as a Service (SaaS) functionality 
to their clients. However, to be able to provide such service, EPOS Ltd requires the support 
of a cloud provider. As part of the project, using our framework, EPOS Ltd security and 
privacy requirements were elicited and analysed and a cloud provider was selected based on 
the EPOS Ltd requirements and the cloud provider characteristics that better matched those 
requirements. Such analysis is described in the following sections.      
 
4.1 Security and Privacy Cataloguing  
 
As discussed in the previous section, the main idea behind the security and privacy 
cataloguing and the construction of the security and privacy reference catalogue diagram is 
two-fold. On one hand, it allows a project team to create a reference point based on existing 
knowledge and previous experience, which can be used to save time and effort and transfer 
knowledge from one project member (e.g. security expert) to another (e.g. requirements 
engineer). On other hand, it supports a better understanding of the relationships between 
security and privacy goals, threats, security and privacy measures, and security and privacy 
mechanisms. This supports a clear common understanding of those concepts from all team 
members. 
In the presented case study, EPOS Ltd had already developed a security document, 
where they had documented the main, according to their analysis, threats, security objectives 
and relevant security mechanisms. As such, it was decided not to construct a cataloguing 
diagram from scratch but to make use of the existing information. However, the security 
document that EPOS Ltd had constructed was a textual description of the relevant security 
issues. Therefore, the first step was to construct the security and privacy cataloguing diagram 
based on the EPOS Ltd security document. The output of that activity is shown in Figure 9. It 
is worth mentioning that we decided not to make any changes to the security document even 
though there was limited consideration for privacy and some of the security analysis was 
different than what we expected.     
 
                                                          
2
 Similarly to the EPOS Confidentiality agreement, we are not allowed to disclose the name of the Night Club, 
so we use the name Good Time Ltd.  
 Fig.9: Partial illustration of Security and Privacy Catalogue Reference Diagram 
4.2 Security and Privacy Analysis 
As discussed in the previous section, the first part of this activity is to define the 
organisational context and in particular organisational goals, relevant actors, their plans, 
resources and security and privacy goals.  
Focusing on our case study, we have identified five actors that are relevant to the case 
study presented in this paper as shown in Figure 10. EPOS Ltd, Night Club Ltd, EPOS 
Software, Cashier, and Card Payment System. The main organisational goal for EPOS Ltd is 
to provide clients with EPOS infrastructure, as part of that Night Club Ltd depends on EPOS 
Ltd to Manage Tills and Receive Licence. In doing so, EPOS needs to Provide Sales 
Management and Provide Licencing, two goals for which EPOS Ltd depends on the EPOS 
Software. To achieve these dependency goals, EPOS Software has three main goals, Manage 
Sales Transactions, Manage Licence and Manage Inventory.   
 
 
 
 Fig. 10: Security and Privacy Organisational diagram 
 
To Satisfy the achievement of the Manage Sales Transaction goal, a number of sub-goals 
need to be satisfied such as Log Sale, Record Sale Item, Manage Payment Type, Record Sale 
Quantity, Generate Receipt, Calculate Sale Price. Some of these goals can be furthered 
refined to include relevant plans. For example, the Manage Payment Type goal is 
decomposed to three plans, Cash Payment, Voucher Payment, and Card Payment. For the 
first two plans, the EPOS Software actor depends on the Cashier to record the cash and 
voucher transactions, while for the last plan the EPOS Software actor depends on the Card 
Payment System to authorise the card payment.  
Once all the relevant actors, plans, resources and dependencies have been identified, 
relevant security and privacy goals are identified and modelled. Going back to the EPOS Ltd 
case study, a number of security (i.e. Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability) and privacy 
(i.e. Identification, Unobservability, and Unlikability) goals have been identified as shown in 
Figure 10. 
The next part of the process focuses on analysing the security and privacy needs for a 
cloud based EPOS Ltd provision. As shown in Figure 11, EPOS Ltd depends on the Cloud 
Provider to Provide EPOS Software as Service, Manage EPOS Software Licencing and 
Provide Cloud Services.  
 
 
 
Fig. 11: Security and Privacy System Diagram 
In the rest of the section we focus on the analysis of one of these goals, i.e. Provide EPOS 
Software as Service. The first step involves identification of relevant threats to that goal. As 
discussed in the previous section, the security and privacy cataloguing can contribute to such 
identification. For example, threats such as Insecure APIs, Service Highjacking that have 
been identified in the catalogue reference diagram, are introduced to the Cloud Service 
Provider actor analysis. In the presented analysis, we consider two more threats Data Leakage 
and Lack of Transparency. On the other hand, our analysis identified a number of security 
constraints that restrict the Provide EPOS Software as Service goal of the Cloud Provider 
actor. To avoid lengthy discussions and to keep the paper to an acceptance level, we focus on 
two security constraints (Ensure Availability of Software, Ensure Data Confidentiality) and 
one privacy constraint (Ensure Data Residency). For each one of these security constraints, 
relevant security and privacy measures and mechanisms are identified. Again, from the 
reference catalogue, availability can be supported by Data Synchronisation and Data 
Recovery measures. These have been added to the analysis of the cloud service provider actor 
as shown in Figure 11. Data Synchronisation can be implemented by ACID (Atomicity, 
consistency, isolation, durability) properties mechanism or BASC (Basically Available, Soft 
State, Eventual Consistency) properties mechanisms. Data Recovery, on the other hand, can 
be implemented by Mirroring Services. Nevertheless, additional measures and resources are 
identified according to the case study. For example, in the EPOS Ltd case study, a number of 
measures and mechanisms were identified that were not catalogued in the reference diagram. 
For example, the Retain Sensitive Data measure can be employed to satisfy the Ensure Data 
Residency privacy constraints. Two relevant mechanisms have been identified that can 
implement that measure, i.e. data tokenisation and encryption. Relevant measures and 
mechanisms have been identified for all the security and privacy constraints as shown in 
Figure 11.  
4.3 Selection Analysis 
The next activity includes the selection of appropriate cloud service providers based on the 
security and privacy requirements identified in the previous step. In particular, as described in 
previous section, we evaluate how specific service providers satisfy the security and privacy 
mechanisms identified in the previous step. In particular, our analysis consisted of the 
evaluation of three cloud providers for different three different types of cloud deployments 
models, i.e. public, private and hybrid cloud. In this paper we focus our case study on the 
privacy model evaluation, since that model scored the most (i.e. overall score of all providers 
was higher for private than public or hybrid) in our analysis across all three providers3. Figure 
12 illustrates the relevant satisfability scores for each provider for 5 security and privacy 
mechanisms identified in the previous step. Following the steps of the selection activity, as 
described in previous section, for each of the providers an overall score is calculated as 
shown below:  
CP1 = (1+0.75+0.5+0.75+1) / 5= 0.8 
CP2 = (1+1+1+1+1+1) / 5 = 1 
CP3 = (1+0.5+0.5+0.75+1) / 5 = 0.75 
 
The provider with the highest score, and therefore preferred, is provider 2.  
                                                          
3
 For confidentiality reasons, we are not able to reveal the true identities of the analysed cloud providers. We 
report however, the real satisfability scores.   
 Fig. 12: Cloud Provider Selection Diagram 
 
5.0 RELATED WORK 
This section discusses related work. In particular, we first discuss literature related to security and 
privacy requirements elicitation and analysis and then works that focus on security and privacy issues 
within the cloud computing domain. 
5.1 Security and Privacy Requirements Elicitation and Analysis 
The literature provides quite few examples of research that focus on the identification and analysis of 
security and privacy properties for the development of software systems.  
 
Mouratidis & Giorgini (2007) propose Secure Tropos, an extension of the Tropos 
methodology. The approach is based on the concept of security constraint to analyse security 
requirements from the early stages of the development process. Similar to that work, Giorgini 
et al. (2003) have extended the i*/Tropos requirements engineering framework to deal with 
security requirements.  Mellado et al.(2007)  introduced the Security Requirements 
Engineering Process (SREP), which is based on several Common Criteria constructs, i.e.,  
security functional components, protection profile, and security assurance components to 
elicit and analysis security requirements. The Security Quality Requirement Engineering 
Methodology (SQUARE) is another security requirements engineering approach similar to 
SREP (Mead et al., 2005). Both SREP and SQUARE are asset-based and risk-driven methods 
that follow a number of steps, for eliciting, categorising, and prioritising security 
requirements. However, SREP integrates knowledge and experience from the Common 
Criteria and Information Security Standards, such as ISO/ IEC 27001, while eliciting security 
requirements. Sindre and Opdahl (2005) have developed a misuse case driven approach to 
establish visual link between use cases and misuse cases for eliciting security requirements at 
an early stage of the development. These links guide analysis of functional requirements 
against security requirements and the threat environment. Chung argues about a process-
oriented approach to represent security requirements as potentially conflicting or harmonious 
goals (Chung, 1993). The proposed NFR (Non-Functional Requirements) framework 
represents and uses security requirements as a class of non-functional requirements and it 
allows developers to consider design decisions and relate these decisions to the represented 
non-functional requirements. On the other hand, Prism provides a security risk management 
framework that is applicable to any organizational context (PRISM). It considers asset based 
risk management process based on strategic planning, asset environment to define risk and 
performance context. However the approach is mostly focused to national critical 
infrastructure. Houmb et al. (2010) introduce the SecReq approach to elicit, analyse and trace 
security requirements from the requirements engineering phase to design. Van Lamsweerde 
& Leiter (2000) introduce the KAOS goal modelling language where goals are considered as 
satisfaction of a statement of intent, and obstacles are obstructions to the goals. KAOS 
introduces the concept of an anti-goal as the intention of an attacker to satisfy a malicious 
goal.  These goals are finally refined as requirements, which are operationalised by agents.   
Pavlidis et al. (2012) use trust based concepts such as resolution, trust, trust relationship, and 
entailment to support analysis and modelling of security. Rosado et al. (2010) demonstrate an 
activity for elicitation, analysis and modelling of security and functional requirements 
(Rosado et al., 2010), where Security is considered as sub -factor of software quality. The 
work systematically uses SPEM 2.0 to define the tasks and integrate the artefacts for the 
security analysis. 
On the other hand, the literature provides examples of works that focus on elicitation 
and analysis of privacy requirements. PriS is a requirements engineering method that 
incorporates privacy requirements early in the system development process (Kalloniatis et al., 
2008). The approach considers privacy requirements as organisational goals that need to be 
satisfied and it adopts the use of privacy process patterns as a way to: (a) describe the effect 
of privacy requirements on business processes; and (b) facilitate the identification of the 
system architecture that best supports the privacy-related business processes. May et al. 
(2006) extract privacy requirements from legal text using access control techniques, while 
Islam et al. (2010) (2011) use natural language patterns with the Hohfeld legal taxonomy to 
extract security requirements from laws, combine them with the ISO/IEC policies and finally 
trace the identified requirements into a secure system design. Deng et al. (2011) present the 
LINDDUN methodology to elicit privacy requirements that consider both hard and soft 
privacy properties. Privacy threats are identified, categorised, and analysed through risk 
management methods. Finally privacy enhancing technologies are identified to address these 
threats. A goal based framework is presented by He and Anton (2003) for modelling privacy 
requirements. Organisational specific context and constraints are used to model the privacy 
requirements through goal based requirements engineering techniques. Legal texts are 
analysed using activity, purpose patterns and a set of rules to extract rights, obligations and 
constraints (Breaux & Anton, 2008). Rights and obligations are the actions that stakeholders 
are permitted and required to perform and in that work they are treated as requirements.  
  All of the above works, focus either on security or privacy. However, the literature provides a 
small number of works that consider both security and privacy. A model based process is proposed 
to support security and privacy requirements engineering using a set of concepts such as goal, 
actor, constraint, and threat (Islam et al., 2012a). Massey et al. (2009) proposed four 
methodological activities to evaluate existing security and privacy requirements for legal 
compliance. The approach in particular prioritises the requirements and establishes 
traceability links from requirements to legal texts. Bellotti & Sellen (1993) developed a 
framework for privacy-aware design in the field of ubiquitous computing. This framework 
proposes a procedure that designers may follow through a set of questions in order to 
evaluate a system. The evaluation is accomplished by identifying a set of new requirements, 
which must be implemented by the developers. A variation of this framework is proposed by 
Hong et al (2004). In spite of the fact, that these frameworks are inexpensive to use and 
relatively fast to implement, a number of disadvantages exist. Firstly, they do not 
address/suggest any implementation techniques for realizing the identified requirements. A 
gap between design and implementation exists since they do not suggest a way for guiding 
the developer from the design to the implementation level.  
 
5.2 Security and Privacy Issues in Cloud Computing  
 
The literature is rich with research efforts that consider security and privacy issues within the 
context of cloud computing. Pearson & Benameur (2010) argued that privacy threats differ 
depending on the type of cloud scenario. They also argued that lack of user control, potential 
unauthorized secondary usage, and data proliferation are more dominate in public clouds. 
Gong et al. showed that using a side-channel attack, an attacker can instantiate new VMs of a 
target virtual machine so that the new VM can potentially monitor the cache hosted on the 
same physical machine (Gong et al., 2010). Grobauer et al. (2011) identified four possible 
places where faults can occur in cloud computing: provider-inner, provider-across, provider 
user and user-across. Mulazzani et al. (2011) showed that attackers can exploit data 
duplication techniques to access customer data by obtaining hash code of the stored file. An 
approach incorporates quality of service into cloud Service Level Agreement (SLA); in 
particular the work measures QoS to predict availability, quantify risk, and consider liability 
in case of failure (Gillam et al, 2012). A goal-drivel approach is introduced to analyse 
security and privacy risks of cloud based system (Islam et al., 2012b). Goals, threats and risks 
are consider from three main components: data, service/application, and technical and 
organisational measure.  Wenzel et al. (2012) consider security and compliance analysis of 
outsourcing services in the cloud computing context. The work initially considers risk 
analysis of business processes that are planned to be outsourced and if the process is 
outsourced then compliance issues are checked. The final part of the approach involves 
security analysis of the physical distribution of the process and communication among the 
entities. Khajeh-Hosseini et al. (2011) introduce cost and benefits and risk tool as decision 
support for public IaaS cloud migration. The cost modelling tool enables user to model IT 
infrastructure using UML. Risks are considered from organisational, legal, security, technical 
and financial perspectives. Khajeh-Hosseini et al. (2010) present a case study of an SME that 
migrates into the cloud. The result shows that despite of many benefits of cloud adaption, 
organisations should pay attention to socio- technical issues such as decrease job satisfaction, 
overall service quality, deterioration of customer care, and departmental downsizing. 
The presented works provide solid contribution to the respected domain. However, 
they demonstrate a number of limitations. Some of the methods, such as Secure Tropos, 
SREP, SQUARE, and SEcReq, focus explicitly on security issues, while others, such as 
LINDDUN, focus on privacy issues. Most of the works related to security focus on the 
requirements stage. For instance, SREP and SQUARE follow a systematic process for 
elicitation and analysis of security requirements, KAOS focus on security analysis through 
anti-goal and obstacles. These works do not consider design issues that could realise the 
identified requirements. On the other hand, the methods that consider both security and 
privacy, treat privacy as a subset of security. Moreover, none of these works considers cloud 
computing. On the other hand, the works that have been developed based on the idea of cloud 
computing, mostly focus on implementation concerns related to security and privacy in the 
cloud, and they do not provide a methodology to support the elicitation and analysis of 
security and privacy requirements and the selection of an appropriate cloud provider based on 
such requirements.  
The work presented here differs from these approaches in that the proposed 
framework provides explicit support for elicitation and analysis of security and privacy 
requirements within the context of cloud computing. To our knowledge based on the 
systematic literature review (as stated previously), there is no work in the literature that 
considers security and privacy issues at the requirements stage within the context of cloud 
computing. The closest effort to our work is the work presented by Zardari and Bahsoon 
(2011) on developing a requirements engineering methodology for the cloud, based on the 
Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering (GORE) paradigm. We consider that work 
complimentary to our work, especially since we share the view that GORE represents an 
important paradigm for supporting software engineering activities for the cloud. However, 
our work has an important difference with that effort. It is focused on security and privacy 
requirements and it introduces a unified framework that supports the elicitation and selection 
of suitable service providers based on security and privacy requirements.  
 
6.0 CONCLUSIONS  
Despite the recent research interest in developing software engineering techniques to support 
systems based on the cloud, the literature fails to provide a systematic and structured 
approach that enables software engineers to identify security and privacy requirements and 
select a suitable cloud service provider based on such requirements. In this paper we have 
presented a novel framework that fills this gap by providing a process to support elicitation of 
security and privacy requirements and selection of a cloud service provider based on the 
satisfiability of the cloud provider to identified security and privacy mechanisms. Our 
framework supports understanding of the organisational context by identifying goals, actors, 
tasks, resources, and plans. Understanding the organisational context helps to identify and 
analyse security, privacy constraints, security and privacy goals, threats and vulnerabilities 
relevant to a cloud based system.  
Through the application of our work to the real case study, we identified a number of 
limitations of our framework. First of all, threats, measures and mechanisms might be 
specific to one deployment or service model and not applicable or applicable in a different 
way to the other models. However, our framework does not allow for such differentiation. 
Moreover, our process does not indicate how the reference catalogue can be updated through 
information gained during a project. For instance, in the application of our work to the EPOS 
case study, a number of measures, mechanisms and threats were identified that were not 
modelled on the reference catalogue that was employed when we started the project.     
Future work will focus on improving the framework with respect to the above 
limitations. Moreover, our efforts will focus on further extending the language to include 
concepts that are relevant to security and privacy, such as trust and also to include the ability 
to identify and select cloud providers based on legal constraints. We also envisage that we 
will extend the applicability of our framework to later stages of the development process, i.e. 
from requirements engineering that is currently applicable to design and implementation, 
where different issues need to be considered when selecting cloud service providers. Last but 
not least we aim to enhance the CASE tool used to support our framework.  
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